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The capability of efﬁciently recognizing reused functions for binary code is critical to many
digital forensics tasks, especially considering the fact that many modern malware typically
contain a signiﬁcant amount of functions borrowed from open source software packages.
Such a capability will not only improve the efﬁciency of reverse engineering, but also
reduce the odds of common libraries leading to false correlations between unrelated code
bases. In this paper, we propose SIGMA, a technique for identifying reused functions in
binary code by matching traces of a novel representation of binary code, namely, the Se-
mantic Integrated Graph (SIG). The SIG s enhance and merge several existing concepts from
classic program analysis, including control ﬂow graph, register ﬂow graph, and function
call graph into a joint data structure. Such a comprehensive representation allows us to
capture different semantic descriptors of common functionalities in a uniﬁed manner as
graph traces, which can be extracted from binaries and matched to identify reused func-
tions, actions, or open source software packages. Experimental results show that our
approach yields promising results. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach through a case study using two malware known to share common functional-
ities, namely, Zeus and Citadel.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The reverse engineering of binary code is generating
signiﬁcant interest among anti-virus companies, security
experts, digital forensics consultants, law-enforcement
agencies, national security agencies, etc. The objective of
reverse engineering often involves understanding both the
control and data-ﬂow structures of the functions in the
given binary code. However, this is usually a challenging
task, because binary code inherently lacks structure due to
the use of jumps and symbolic addresses, highly optimizedoration between the
University, Defence
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ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWScontrol ﬂow, varying registers and memory locations based
on the processor and compiler, and the possibility of in-
terruptions (Balliu et al., 2014).
To assist reverse engineers in such a challenging task,
automated tools for efﬁciently recognizing reused func-
tions and their open source origins for binary code are
highly desirable. This is especially true in the context of
malware analysis, since modern malware are known to
contain a signiﬁcant amount of library code derived from
either standard compiler libraries or open source software
packages. The Flame malware, for instance, contains pub-
licly available code packages, including SQLite and LUA
(Bencsath et al., 2012). Hence, the ability to automatically
identify reused functions may greatly enhance the effec-
tiveness and efﬁciency of reverse engineering in such cases.
Existing techniques for identifying reused functions can
be roughly categorized into static and dynamic approaches.. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71S62In a static approach to function identiﬁcation, different
methods have focused on features at different levels (e.g.,
syntactical, semantical). For example, one existing tech-
nique counts mnemonics (opcode names, e.g., add or mov)
in a sliding window over program text (Myles and Collberg,
2005). Another technique discovers exact and inexact
clones in binaries through n-grams with normalization
(linear naming of registers and memory locations) to
address changes in names across different binaries
(Saebjørnsen et al., 2009). Recently, an approach combines
n-grams with small non-isomorphic sub-graphs of the
controleﬂow graph to allow for structural matching (Khoo
et al., 2013). More recently, another approach introduces
tracelet-based code search in executables that attempts to
statistically locate similar functions in the code base after
translating the assembly instructions into an intermediate
language (David and Yahav, 2014). While those techniques
are not intended to address malware binaries, the authors
in Ruttenberg et al. (2014) identify shared software com-
ponents to support malware forensics. In contrast to most
static approaches that focus on one type of features, our
approach combines different sources of information into
one uniﬁed representation of binary code and thus has the
potential of producingmore accurate results. As to dynamic
approaches, since they typically involve executing the code
in order to detect the functionality, such approaches usu-
ally suffer from prohibitive runtime or exponential growth
of execution paths (Calvet et al., 2012; Gr€obert et al., 2011).
In this paper, we propose SIGMA, a technique for iden-
tifying reused functions in binary code by matching traces
of a novel representation of binary code, namely, the se-
mantic integrated graph (SIG). The SIG s enhance andmerge
several existing concepts from classic program analysis,
including control ﬂow graph, register ﬂow graph, and
function call graph, into a joint data structure. Such a
comprehensive representation allows us to capture
different semantic descriptors of common functionalities in
a uniﬁed manner as traces of SIG graphs. Such SIG graph
traces can then be extracted from binaries and matched,
either exactly or approximately, to identify reused func-
tions, actions, or open source software packages.
In summary, our contributions to the problem of iden-
tifying reused functions in binary code are as follows.
 We introduce the novel SIG representation of binary
code to unify various semantic information, such as
control ﬂow, register manipulation, and function call
into a joint data structure to facilitate more efﬁcient
graph matching.
 We deﬁne different types of traces such as normal
traces, AND-traces, and OR-traces over SIG graphs,
which are used for inexact matching. We carry out both
exact and inexact matching between different binaries,
where an exact matching applies to two SIG graphs with
the same graph properties (e.g. number of nodes),
whereas an inexact matching employs graph edit dis-
tance to measure the degree of similarity between two
SIG graphs of different sizes.
 We evaluate our method by experimenting different
variants of sort and encryption functions. Experimentalresults show that our method achieves similarity score
close to an optimal similarity matching.
 Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach through a case study using two known mal-
ware, which share common functionalities, namely,
Zeus and Citadel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
Existing Representations of Binary Code reviews several
existing representations of binary code. Section SIGMA
Approach provides a detailed description of the main
methodology. Section Experimental Results evaluates the
proposed approach and compares it to existing work. Sec-
tion Case Study describes our case study. Section
Limitations and Future Direction gives limitations and
future directions. Section Related Work reviews related
work, and Section Conclusion draws conclusions.
Existing representations of binary code
Numerous representations of binary code have been
developed for different purposes of program analysis, such
as data ﬂow analysis, control ﬂow analysis, call graph
analysis, structural ﬂow analysis, register manipulation
analysis, and program dependency analysis. While these
representations have been designed primarily for
analyzing binary code, they can certainly be employed to
characterize the code. In particular, we focus on three
representations that capture structural information,
namely, control ﬂow graph, register ﬂow graph, and
function call graph. These representations form the basis
of our approach to identifying reused functions in binary
code. For the sake of clarity, we introduce a running
example to illustrate these representations using the
following sample code (bubble sort).
Control ﬂow graph
Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) have been used for a variety
of applications, e.g., to detect variants of known malicious
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71 S63applications (Cesare et al., 2013). A CFG describes the order
in which basic block statements are executed as well as the
conditions that need to be met for a particular path of
execution. To this end, basic blocks are represented by
nodes connected by directed edges to indicate the transfer
of control. It is necessary to assign a label true (t), false
(f), or ε to each edge. In particular, a normal node has one
outgoing edge labeled ε, whereas a predicate node has two
outgoing edges corresponding to a true or false evaluation
of the predicate. As an example, the CFG for bubble sort is
shown in Fig. 1(a). In our context, CFG is a standard code
representation in reverse engineering to aid in under-
standing the structure of binary. However, while CFGs
expose the control ﬂow of a given code, they fail to provide
other useful information, such as the way registers are
manipulated by the code and the interaction between
different functions.Fig. 2. SIGMA architecture.Register ﬂow graph
A Register Flow Graph (RFG) is used to capture how
registers are manipulated by binary code, which is origi-
nally designed for authorship identiﬁcation of binary code
(Alrabaee et al., 2014). RFGs describe the ﬂow and de-
pendencies between registers as an important semantic
aspect of the behavior of a program, which might indicate
authorship as well as functionality. We brieﬂy review the
concept through an example shown in Fig. 1(b). In the RFG,
two labels are assigned to edges; b represents the basic
block to which the compare instruction belongs (basic
block id), and s is the cost that is assigned based on the ﬂow
of the register values (instruction counts). Regardless of the
number or complexity degree of functions, the following
registers are often accessed: ebp, esp, esi, edx, eax, and
ecx. Therefore, the steps involved in constructing an RFG
for these registers are as follows.
 Counting the number of compare instructions,
 Checking the registers for each compare instruction,
 Checking the ﬂow of each register from the beginning
until the compare is reached,Fig. 1. Classical representations for bubble sort function: (a) Control Classifying the register changes according to the 15
proposed classes in Alrabaee et al. (2014).
In RFGs, assembly instructions are classiﬁed into four
families: Stack, Arithmetic, Logical, and Generic operation,
as detailed in the following.
 Arithmetic: add, sub, mul, div, imul, idiv, etc.
 Logical: or, and, xor, test, shl.
 Generic: mov, lea, call, jmp, jle, etc.
 Stack: push and pop.Flow Graph (b) Register Flow Graph (c) Function Call Graph.
Table 1
Structural information categories.
Category Description
Data Transfer
(DT)
Data transfer instructions such
as mov, movzx, movsx
Test(T) Test instructions such as cmp, test
ArLo Arithmetic and logical instructions
such as add, sub, mul, div, imul, idiv,
and, or, xor, sar, shr
CaLe System call, API call, and Load
effective instructions such as lea
Stack Stack instructions such as push, pop
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71S64Function call graph
A Function Call Graph (FCG) is the representation of a
function in binary code as a directed graph with labeled
vertices, where the vertices correspond to functions and
the edges to function calls. Two labels, I and E are assigned
to the nodes; I represents internal library functions and E
represents external library functions. An example of FCG
for the bubble function is shown in Fig. 1(c). In the litera-
ture, external call graphs have been used for malware
detection (Elhadi et al., 2014). In such a case, model graphs
and data graphs are compared in order to distinguish call
graphs representing benign programs from those based on
malware samples (Riesen et al., 2010; Elhadi et al., 2014).
SIGMA approach
In this section, we ﬁrst provide an overview of the
proposed SIGMA approach in Section Overview. We then
describe the three building blocks of an SIG in Section
Building Blocks. We introduce the SIG concept in Section
SIG: Semantic Integrated Graph. Finally, we describe
methods for SIG graph matching in Section Graph Edit
Distance.
Overview
The overall architecture of our SIGMA approach is
depicted in Fig. 2. There are two main phases: (i) training
phase, and (ii) testing phase, detailed as follows.
The training phase consists of four steps; (i) disassem-
bling the executable and manually ﬁltering out compiler-Table 2
Color classes for iCFG.
Color classes Majority Minority
1/2/3 DT, T ArLo/Stack/CaLe
4/5/6 DT, ArLo T/CaLe/Stack
7/8/9 DT, CaLe ArLo/Stack/T
10/11/12 DT, Stack T/CaLe/ArLo
13/14/15 T, ArLo DT/CaLe/Stack
16/17/18 T, CaLe DT/ArLo/Stack
19/20/21 T, Stack DT/ArLo/CaLe
22/23/24 ArLo, Stack T/DT/CaLe
25/26/27 ArLo, CaLe Stack/DT/T
28/29/30 Stack, Cale T/DT/ArLorelated functions; (ii) constructing CFG, RFG, and FCG
graphs from user functions; (iii) applying structural infor-
mation to CFG to obtain the informational control ﬂow
graph, iCFG; applying new merged classes to RFG to obtain
a merged register ﬂow graph, mRFG; and applying colored
classes to FCG to obtain a colored function call graph, cFCG
(these concepts will be explained in Section Building
Blocks). (iv) Merging the previous graphs into a single
representation called SIG. We then decompose the SIG into
a set of traces aiming to apply inexact matching between
different graphs. Moreover, we consider various properties
of the SIG, such as the total number of nodes, node types
(data, control, dependence, or structural), edge types, total
number of edges, the depth of the graph, etc. We save these
details into a database with the function ID. On the other
hand, given a set of unknown assembly instructions, the
testing phase construct the SIG and extract the properties of
the constructed graph and compare it with the existing SIG
s graphs in the database. Hence, we have two methods for
matching graphs: (i) exact matching: two graphs are said to
match exactly if they have the same properties. (ii) inexact
matching: it is based on edit distance calculation and the
result is compared to predeﬁned threshold value d. Two
functions are the same if their similarity score is less than d.
More formally, we have following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1. Let f1, f2 be two functions, we say f1 is the
copy (or origin) of f2, if SIG(f1) matches SIG(f2).
Deﬁnition 2. Let f1, f2 be two functions, and SIG(f1)/ a
and SIG(f2)/ b denote extracting SIG traces a and b from
f1 and f2. Let sim(a,b) be a similarity function and d a
predeﬁned threshold value (d < 1). We say f1 and f2 are
similar if sim(a,b)< d.Building blocks
In this section, we extend the existing representations
introduced in Section Existing Representations of Binary
Code to form the building blocks of SIG.
Structural information control ﬂow graph (iCFG)
As mentioned in Section Existing Representations of
Binary Code, traditional CFGs consist of basic blocks each
of which is a sequence of instructions terminating with a
branch instruction.We can thus only obtain the structure of
a function from a CFG. The lack of more detailed informa-
tion in CFGs means two entirely different functions may
yield the same CFG, which will cause confusion for iden-
tifying similar functions. Therefore, we extend standard
CFGs with a colored scheme based on structural informa-
tion about the probable role or functionality of each node.
For example, if the majority of instructions in one node is
arithmetic or logical, it may provide hints about the func-
tionality of the node (e.g., cryptographic function usually
involves a large number of for loops). By enriching stan-
dard CFGs with such information as different colors of
nodes, which we call iCFG, we have a better chance to
distinguish two functions even if they have the same CFG
structure. Table 1 shows some example categories of
structural information we consider in coloring the nodes.
Fig. 3. Enhanced classical representations for bubble sort function: (a) iCFG (b) mRFG (c) cFCG.
Table 3
Updated classes of register access.
Class Arithmetic Logical Generic Stack C C C Reg ML ML ML Reg ML C
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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(i) the two highest percentages, and (ii) the lowest per-
centage, among the proposed categories. By considering
the highest percentages, we aim to measure the majority
category in the function. We choose two highest percent-
ages because we have noticed that some classes, such as
Data Transfer, are always dominant in many cases such
that considering in addition the second highest percentageFig. 4. Simple example of SIG.would provide more reliable coloring. Table 2 shows color
classes for iCFG. Each row shows three classes. For example,
the second row shows classes 1, 2, and 3; class 2 occurs
when the two majorities are DT, T and the minority is
Stack.
As an example, by applying the color classes in Table 2 to
Fig.1(a), we can obtain the iCFG shown in Fig. 3(a). This iCFG
involves ﬁve color classes: 22, 4, 3, 10, and 1. From Table 2,
we can see that the majority of those classes belong to:
ArLo-Stack, DT-ArLo, DT-T, DT-Stack, DT-T. This is
reasonable since the main functionality of the bubble sort
algorithm is manipulating values in an array and conse-
quently the main action is transferring the values from one
location to another, which explains the large number of DT
instructions. As demonstrated by the example, by using this
extended control ﬂow graph iCFG, we can capture more
semantic information that might be helpful in identifying
functions in binary code. Nonetheless, the iCFG only con-
tains control information about basic blocks, and it lacks
other useful semantics, such as the way registers are
manipulated and the way functions interact with each
other. Hence, we introduce two other building blocks in
addition to iCFG.
Table 4
Some traces of bubble sort function SIG
Node Traces Traces type
22 ε, ε, C8
t
out
in
4 f, C14
ε, f
out
in
22 OR 4 ε, C8, C14, f
f, t, ε
out
in
4 AND 3 f
f
out
in
Table 5
Graph Features for bubble sort function.
Features Frequency
Total # of Nodes 15
Total # of Edges 18
# of Control Nodes 5
# of Control Edges 8
# of Call Nodes 4
# of Register Nodes 6
Connected Graphs 3
k-Cone 1, 2
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71S66Merged register ﬂow graph (mRFG)
As mentioned in Section Existing Representations of
Binary Code, RFG is a binary code representation for
capturing program behaviors based on an important se-
mantics of the code, i.e., how registers aremanipulated. The
original RFG is designed for authorship attribution pur-
poses, therefore it lacks support for some cases that are
important for function identiﬁcation: i) when both oper-
ands of cmp are constants (C), ii) when one of the operands
is a constant and the other one is a register (reg), iii) when
both operands are memory locations (ML), iv) when one of
the operands is a memory location and the other one is a
register, and v) when the operands are a mixture of con-
stants and memory locations. These cases are especially
important for identifying functions in binary code, and
hence we extend the RFG by adding several new classes as
shown in Table 3.
Moreover, as another improvement over the original
RFG representation, we merge certain nodes inside an RFG,
e.g., class one and class two together are equivalent to class
ﬁve. In this manner, we can reduce the number of nodes to
improve the efﬁciency in analyzing an RFG. Finally, since
the original RFG depends only on the cmp instructions, we
also extend RFG instructions to the test instruction. After
applying those extensions andmodiﬁcations, we obtain the
new representation mRFG, as shown in Fig. 3(b). The mRFG
has three more nodes than its corresponding RFG; one of
these is test instruction, and the other two are related to
the immediate memory address and the constant. More-
over, we have merged the original classes (nodes in blue):
C8  C3 to C8, C1  C1 to C1, and C5  C14 to C11. The
reference to the new classes C17 and C19 may provide
useful semantics about the functions, for instance bubble
sort functionmainly deals with constants and sorts them in
memory locations.
Color function call graph (cFCG)
As mentioned in Section Existing Representations of
Binary Code, traditional FCGs represent system calls in a
binary code. Among a set of system calls C ¼ {C1, C2,…, Cn},
each call may be either internal or external. To distinguish
these from each other, we extend FCGs with a color scheme
as follows. The function of coloring nodes deﬁnes the color
class a in two cases. For an internal call, we only need one
color, because internal system calls are mostly related to
compiler functions rather than to user functions. As toFig. 5. SIG for bubble sort function.external calls, we deﬁne the color classes using a range of
values 0 < a < 1, because we may have various external
system calls potentially connecting to API that is very
important for identifying functions. More precisely, we
extend FCGs to a new representation which we call cFCG,
using the color function deﬁned as follows.
f ðcÞ ¼

a ¼ 0; if c is internal system call
0<a<1; if c is external system call
As an example, having applied this new representation
to our running example, we obtain the cFCG shown in
Fig. 3(c). Besides serving as a building block of our proposed
approach, the cFCG representation may also be helpful in
other related tasks by highlighting the difference between
various types of calls. This kind of graph may use for mal-
ware analysis, for instance, malware clustering through
clustering external system calls.Fig. 6. Similarity scores of function variants.
Table 6
Similarity between sort function variants (B:Bubble sort Q:Quick sort H:Heap sort M:Merge sort).
B.1 B.2 Q.1 Q.2 M.1 M.2 H.1 H.2
B.1 100% 93% 71% 67% 62% 73% 65% 62%
B.2 96% 100% 79% 80% 70% 72% 60% 68%
Q.1 79% 83% 100% 94% 76% 71% 65% 60%
Q.2 71% 69% 95% 100% 79% 77% 74% 65%
M.1 67% 76% 66% 68% 100% 97% 70% 74%
M.2 73% 69% 77% 78% 94% 100% 70% 72%
H.1 69% 67% 74% 73% 79% 79% 100% 96%
H.2 72% 71% 64% 69% 79% 78% 95% 100%
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71 S67SIG: semantic integrated graph
The building blocks introduced in the previous section
provide complementary views on binary code by empha-
sizing on different aspects of the underlying function se-
mantics. Inspired by a recent work (Yamaguchi et al., 2014),
in which different representations of source code are
combined for vulnerability detection in source code (which
is a different problem fromours as binary code lackmuch of
the useful information available in source code), we
combine those different but complementary representa-
tions of binary code into a joint data structure in order to
facilitate more efﬁcient graph matching between different
binary code for identifying reused functions. Formally, a
semantic integrated graph (SIG) is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. A semantic integrated graph is a directed
attributed graph G ¼ (N,V,z,g,w,l,g,j,u,d) where N is a set of
nodes, V4 (N  N) is a set of edges and g is a set of labels
(e.g. t) where z is edge labeling function which assigns a
label to each edge: z/ g. w is coloring functionwhere each
color represents statistical meaning for each node n ε N
based on statistical classes l. g is a function for coloring
system calls where j is a list of external system call labels.
Finally, u is a function for coloring mRFG nodes where d is
the list of register classes list.
Fig. 4 illustrates a simple example of SIG with four
nodes. Note that a SIG is a multigraph so two nodes might
be connected by multiple edges, e.g., edges corresponding
to mRFG or cFCG. Moreover, A,B,C, and D represent the
outcomes of coloring function w, and t,f, and ε are the
outcomes of function z. Outcomes of function g are a1, a2,
and 0, where 0 represents an internal call, and a1 and a2
represent two different external calls. C1, C5, C2, and
C11 are outcomes of function u.
To utilize the SIG for inexact matching and matching
fragments of a function, we need to consider meaningful
subgraphs of SIG. Again inspired by Yamaguchi et al. (2014),
we decompose a SIG into short paths called traces, where
each trace is represented as 9: S(N)/ S(N') that maps a set
of nodes in an SIG to another set of nodes according to given
criteria, where S(N) denotes the power set of N. The main
advantage of such a deﬁnition is the composition of mul-
tiple traces always yields another trace, i.e., 90 and 91 can be
chained together to 90 + 91. We deﬁne a number of
elementary traces that serve as a basis for the construction
of other traces, and some examples are shown in the
following (each trace function also has other simpler forms,
which are omitted due to space limitations).OUTM;I;L;KðYÞ ¼ ∪
nεY
fm : ðn; mÞεV ; zðn; mÞ ¼ M; wðn; mÞ
¼ I; lðn; mÞ ¼ L; uðn; mÞ ¼ K

INMðYÞ ¼ ∪
nεY
fm : ðn; mÞεV ; zðn; mÞ ¼ M

ORð91; 92;…; 9nÞ ¼ 91∪92∪…∪9n
ANDð91; 92;…; 9nÞ ¼ 91∩92∩…∩9n
The trace OutM,I,L,K returns all nodes reachable over edge
M and node I. All nodes connected with the node of the
other graph with label L and K. Trace InM represents the in-
edge to each node to move backwards in the graph, and the
two traces OR and AND aggregate the outputs of other
traces.
Example: SIG for bubble sort function
Here, we give an example of SIG for the bubble sort
function depicted in Fig. 5. As an example of SIG trace, we
show the traces of nodes 22, 4, and 3 as well as one
example of OR and AND traces in Table 4. Moreover, we
extract additional features as depicted in Table 5. The fea-
tures in Table 5 include total number of nodes, number of
control edges (e.g., 22), number of call nodes (e.g., 0),
number of register nodes (e.g., C8), and etc. Those features
together with the SIG traces are sufﬁcient for exact
matching of SIG s, and we will discuss inexact matching in
next section.Graph edit distance
For inexact matching between SIG s, we need a distance
metric. In this paper, we employ the graph edit distance for
this purpose. The edit distance between two graphs mea-
sures their similarity in terms of the number of edits
needed to transform one into the other (Hu et al., 2009).We
implement this concept as follows. Given two SIG s, we
deﬁne the following two elementary traces to transform
one graph into another: Edge-edit traces, including 9kr,
re-labels the edge, and Node-edit traces, including 9nr,
re-colors the node by merging nodes from the other graph
into one node. An edit edge VG,H between two SIG s G and H,
is deﬁned as a set of sequence of traces (91, 92, …, 9n) such
that G ¼ 9n (91(9n  1(H) (… 91(H) …))). To quantify this
Table 7
Similarity between encryption function variants (R:RC4 T:TEA A:AES M:MD5).
R.1 R.2 T.1 T.2 M.1 M.2 A.1 A.2
R.1 100% 86% 68% 57% 52% 61% 57% 62%
R.2 89% 100% 74% 66% 53% 72% 50% 59%
T.1 72% 79% 100% 87% 66% 61% 55% 67%
T.2 68% 62% 89% 100% 72% 67% 69% 55%
M.1 57% 69% 58% 51% 100% 91% 78% 74%
M.2 63% 67% 67% 70% 92% 100% 78% 72%
A.1 69% 57% 64% 68% 79% 75% 100% 94%
A.2 62% 71% 69% 64% 70% 73% 89% 100%
Table 8
Dissimilarity between sort and encryption functions.
Bubble.1 Quick.1 Merge.1 Heap.1
RC4.1 86% 93% 79% 87%
TEA.1 96% 91% 79% 89%
MD5.1 79% 88% 90% 94%
AES.1 89% 91% 95% 84%
Fig. 7. (a) The relation between the number of variants and the similarity
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71S68similarity, the weight of all edit traces is measured, i.e.,
V ¼ (9n, 92, …, 9n) as w(V) ¼
Pn
i¼1wð9iÞ. The edit distance
between two SIG s is thus deﬁned as the minimum weight
of all edit edges and nodes between them, i.e.,
sim(G,H) ¼min w(VG, H). The distance measure between the
nodes follows the same reasoning, with operations instead
of traces. In Algorithm 1, we calculate the graph edit dis-
tance between two SIG s G and H, by measuring the cost of
transforming G to H. The algorithm starts by extracting thescore (b) The accuracy of using exact and approximate matching.
Fig. 8. SIG for RC4 in Citadel.
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71 S69traces of the two graphs as mentioned earlier, and then
checks the cost of transforming each node in G to nodes in
H, and ﬁnally calculates the total cost.
We deﬁne the dissimilarity between two SIG s G and H
as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. The dissimilarity r(G,H) between two SIG s is
a value in [0, 1], where 0 indicates the graphs are the most
similar and 1 indicates the least similar, as formulated in
the following.
rðG; HÞ ¼ wðVG;HÞjNGj þ jNHj þ jVGj þ jVHj þ j9Gj þ j9Hj
where w(VG,H) is the weighted cost of traces, jNGj and jNHj
are the number of nodes, jVGj and jVHj are the number of
edges, and j9Gj and j9Hj are the number of traces in G and H
respectively.Experimental results
We implement and test the proposed technique, SIGMA,
with variants of sort algorithms and encryption algorithms
in order to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of the
proposed method. We employed two variants for each sort
algorithm(e.g., bubble, quick, merge, and heap) and each
encryption algorithm (e.g., RC4, MD5, Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), and Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA)).
Using the proposed method, similarity scores amongst
these samples are calculated based on the graph editdistance and dissimilarity formulas introduced in previous
section. The results are depicted in Fig. 6. A promising value
with about 80% similarity score pairs ranging from 0.42 to 1
can be seen in the results. Furthermore, the similarity score
on pairs ranging from 0 to 0.2 is only about 10%. The results
clearly show that our approach can capture common
characteristics between functions relatively well. The oc-
currences of low-score pairs are mainly due to the signiﬁ-
cant differences in the sizes of functions and variants, and
also the number of nodes, edges, and traces may be
observably different. For instance, the number of nodes in a
bubble sort variant a is 15, whereas for variant b is 22; the
number of edges in each one is 18 and 43, and the number
of traces is 147 and 278, respectively. Table 6 and Table 7,
show similarity scores of each pair of sort functions and
encryption functions, respectively. The values (100%) in the
main diagonal are the similarity scores for the variants
when compared to themselves.
We can see from Tables 6 and 7 that similarity scores
amongst the sort functions are higher than those among
encryption functions. This is due to the fact that the steps of
sorting are similar among different algorithms but the
steps of encryption functions vary signiﬁcantly with each
algorithm.
In Table 6, the similarities between heap and other al-
gorithms are lower, because the steps of heap sort are
signiﬁcantly different from the other sort algorithms steps.
In Table 7, the similarity scores show that RC4 is more
similar to TEA, than MD5 is to AES. This is due to the fact
that RC4 and TEA have steps in common in the encryption
process. In Table 8, the dissimilarity scores between sort
algorithms and encryption algorithms are listed. In addi-
tion, Fig. 7 shows the relation between similarity score and
function variants. It is clear that with more than seven
variants, the similarity score is below 0.5, whichmeans that
receiving false positive results is potential. Moreover, we
can see that our approach yields better results for sort
functions than for encryption functions. This is mainly
because the steps involved in sorting do not vary signiﬁ-
cantly with the algorithm used, but those involved in
encryption will vary for each algorithm. These may also be
different when we have different variants of the same
algorithm.
Case study
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach when
applied to real world binary code, we brieﬂy describe a case
study about two well known malware, namely, Citadel
and Zeus. In particular, we would like to identify the
stream cipher RC4 function used in both malware. The SIGs
corresponding to the RC4 function in Citadel and Zeus
are illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively. The RC4 func-
tion in Zeus is known to be a reused function from
Citadel with slight modiﬁcations. As can be seen in the
ﬁgures, the two SIG s have common nodes (e.g. 28, 4, and
11). These common nodes were colored based on the ma-
jority and the minority of the instruction types, which
indicate that these common nodes lead to common actions.
In addition, we can observe that both graphs have two
common register classes (e.g. C19).
Fig. 9. SIG for RC4 in Zeus.
Table 9
Exact matching between SIG-RC4 in Citadel and Zeus.
Features SIG-RC4 (Zeus) SIG-RC4 (Citadel) Similarity
Total # of Nodes 7 9 78%
Total # of Edges 8 11 72%
# of Control Nodes 5 5 100%
# of Control Edges 6 7 86%
# of Call Nodes 1 0 50%
# of Register Nodes 2 3 67%
Connected Graphs 3 3 100%
K-Cone 1,2,3,4 1,2,3 75%
Average Similarity 78.5%
Table 10
Inexact matching between SGF-RC4 in Citadel and Zeus.
Citadel
node
Zeus
node
Costs Node(s) with
minimum cost
Cost %
13 12 1 out, 0 in 12 (1/10)
28 1 out, 1 in e
4 1 out, 2 in e
29 1 out, 1 in e
11 0 out, 2 in e
28 12 3 out, 0 in e
28 0 out, 0 in 28 (Select this) 0
4 3 out, 1 in e
29 0 out, 0 in 29
11 0 out, 1 in e
4 12 0 out, 0 in 12 (Already chosen)
28 1 out, 1 in e
4 0 out, 0 in 4 (Select this) 0
29 1 out, 1 in e
11 0 out, 0 in 11
11 12 2 out, 0 in e
28 1 out, 0 in 28 (Already chosen)
4 2 out, 2 in e
29 1 out, 0 in 29 (Select this) (1/10)
11 0 out, 2 in e
12 12 2 out, 0 in e
28 1 out, 1 in e
4 2 out, 0 in e
29 1 out, 1 in e
11 0 out, 1 in 11 (1/9)
Total Cost 0.311
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71S70More precisely, Fig. 8 illustrates two nodes of mRFG
within the ﬁrst four connected nodeswhich are the same as
shown in Fig. 9, which captures the similarity in terms of
traces. Based on the SIG s and their traces, we conduct exact
matching and inexact matching, whose results are shown
in Table 9 and Table 10, respectively. The exact matching
shows that the similarity is 78.5%, and the cost for inexact
matching is 0.311 (close to 0).Limitations and future direction
The previous section shows that our proposed SIGMA
approach yields promising results for identifying reused
functions in binary code. Nonetheless, the approach still
has following limitations which wewould like to address in
our future work.
 Like most existing approaches, SIGMA assumes that bi-
nary code is already de-obfuscated. We note that,
however, SIGMA can in fact address certain forms of
obfuscation, such as register reassignments and code
recording. Our future work will investigate this poten-
tial direction.
 As a learning-based approach, SIGMA also requires
training data of known functionalities with multiple
variants in order to collect sufﬁcient features prior to its
application to given code. To this end, we intend to build
a feature database for common functionalities by
applying SIGMA to publicly available code.
 We have not investigated the impact of different com-
pilers in this study. However, we believe that SIGMA can
overcome some of the changes caused by compilers
with the rich set of structural information it captures,
and we will conﬁrm this in future work.
 Our future work will also evaluate the capability of the
proposed method for dealing with fragments of
functions.
Related work
Our main inspiration comes from the recent work of
combining different source code representations for
discovering vulnerabilities (Yamaguchi et al., 2014). In
addition to the idea of combining different sources of in-
formation, we also borrow the deﬁnitions of graph traces.
However, we note that the authors deal with a very
different problem, which is to model and detect vulnera-
bilities, than ours, which is to identify reused functions.
Another major difference is that we work on binary code
instead of source code. This implies that we must employ
entirely different representations, since much of the useful
information available in source code, such as abstract
syntax trees, is not applicable to binary code. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst effort on the use of multiple
sources of structural information for binary code analysis.
For identifying reused functions in binary code, existing
work mainly fall into two categories: (i) static, and (ii) dy-
namic. We brieﬂy review static approaches since our work
is based on static analysis.Within static analysis, there exist
some work that employ graphical representations. Inter-
procedural control ﬂow using the call graphs of a program
have been compared to show similarity to existingmalware
(Hu et al., 2009), where common nodes between two
program call graphs are discovered. The authors in Lee et al.
(2010) build their graph by transforming a portable
executable into a call graph with nodes and edges that
capture system calls and system call sequences, respec-
tively. They then convert the graph to a code graph to
expedite analysis. The authors in Elhadi et al. (2014) pro-
pose a method where each malware sample is represented
S. Alrabaee et al. / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S61eS71 S71as an API call graph by integrating API calls and operating
system resources to represent graph nodes. The authors in
Stojanovic et al. (2014) compare metric values and intro-
duce transformers and formulas that could use training
data to generate a measure of the similarities between two
procedures in binary code. The authors in Xu et al. (2013)
propose a method to identify malware variants based on
a functionecall graph. The authors in (Edler von Koch et al.,
2014) develop a pragmatic effective code size reduction
technique that exploits the structural similarity of func-
tions. Unlike most existing work, our approach employs
multiple sources of structural information to deﬁne the
distance between variants of functions, which allows for
more reliable and efﬁcient matching. Our approach also
differs from many existing work in the capabilities of
inexact matching and matching function fragments based
on graph traces.
Conclusion
The reverse engineering of binary code is an important
but challenging task that demands automated techniques
for preprosessing and cleaning the code. The identiﬁcation
of reused functions in binary code is one of the important
aspect of this issue that has received limited attention in
comparison with other aspects of binary analysis. In this
paper, we have presented a novel approach called SIGMA
for effectively identifying reused functions in binary code.
Instead of relying on one source of information, our
approach combines multiple representations into one joint
data structure SIG. SIGMA also supports inexact matching
and exact matching based on traces of the SIG which deals
with function fragments. Both experimental results and
case study have demonstrated the effectiveness of our
method, and we have described several potential im-
provements to the approach in the previous section.
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